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A family household can be defined "as those members of the house­
hold who are related, to a specified degree, through blood, adoption 
or marriage."1 The definition, as quoted, is applied in the source to 
the term "family," but the discussion goes on to say that the latter term 
can.be and is used inawider sense of a group related by blood, adoption 
and marriage, comprising more than one household. The emphasis on family 
households is a matter of statistical expediency, since identification 
of families comprising more than one household is difficult. 
To the extent that ties of blood, marriage, or adoption are indica­
tive of a community of interest, the family, in this wider sense, is an 
important unit in economic analysis--since it presumably makes joint 
decisions on the production and disposition of income, either in a continu­
ous and comprehensive fashion, or intermittently and for a limited range 
of decisions. The possibility of such joint decisions on the economic 
choices of the family makes the unit important in the analysis of income 
inequalities, of the supply of labor force, and of the flow of savings 
and capital formation. The statistical data that are available for use 
below all relate to households, not limited to family households. 2 But 
in evaluating the data and the findings that they suggest, we must keep 
in mind the concept of the family as a group, the relations among 
whose members are close enough to lead to significant joint decisions 
on economic matters. 
Two earlier papers, to which the present one is a sequel, suggested 
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findings relating to households that are relevant here, and may be briefly 
noted. 
3 
First, in general, the average household in the less developed 
countries and regions has, in recent years, been significantly larger than 
in the developed countries. One major factor in this difference is the 
significantly larger proportion of children in the total population of 
LDCs than of the DCs--and children are preponderantly members of family 
households. Second, the differences in size of households within the country 
are, as might be expected, positively associated with total income per 
household. But if we shift to household inc.ome per person, the smaller 
households tend to show, quite generally, higher levels of per person 
income than larger households. 
The analysis below deals largely with comparisons of average size of 
household--in international cross-section for recent years, in intra­
national comparisons of households between the rural and urban populations, 
and in comparisons over long time spans for a single country. The aim 
is to allocate the differences in average size between the contribution 
of the presence of children (reflecting differences in fertility and rates 
of natural increase) and that of the tendency of adults to live jointly 
or separately. The basis for such an allocation is first presented in a 
comparison for the United States (March 1976) and Taiwan (end of 1975) 
for which we have the requisite detailed data (Section II). Such allocations 
of differences in average size are then illustrated for comparisons among 
countries or regions at different levels of development; comparisons 
of rural and urban households within one the same country; and those over 
a long time span within a country (Section III). The distinctive character-
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istics of the much larger proportion of small households, all adult, in 
the developed regions as compared with those less developed, is explored 
in Section IV, again in a co~parison between United States and Taiwan, 
using the cross-classifications of households by size and by age of head 
(and partly by sex of head). Concluding comments bring us back to the wider 
concept of the family mentioned above, in an attempt to evaluate the signi­
ficance of our findings for households in their bearing upon the economic 
role of the family, widely defined, in countries or regions at different 
levels of economic development. 
II. Allocation of Differences in Size of Average Household: 
An Illustration. 
The comparison of the distributions of households by size (and related 
variables) in Uni~ed States and Taiwan, in Table 1, provides an illustra­
tion that would help us outline the procedure for distinguishing the 
differences due to presence of children from those attributable to differ­
ing propensities of related adults to live together (or apart). The 
interest in this distinction stems from the difference in the sources of 
what might be called the NIC factor (natural increase-children) and 
the JAA factor (jointness or apartness of adults). In almost all countries, 
children are the responsibility of their parents or of other related members 
of the family--so that they are naturally members of family households 
and their proportion in total population would, all other conditions 
being equal, be positively associated with the average size of the house­
hold. But in a population with limited emigration and immigration, the 
proportion of children is a function of fertility and survival--so that 
there is a direct line of connection between the population's vital rates 
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Table 1 
Structure of Households by Size, 
United States, 1970 and 1976, and Taiwan, 1975 
A. United States 1 March 1970 and urch 1976
Relatives, March 1 1970March 2 1976 Money Income %Shares Peraons ~er HH:
% Shares in: BHa Be1ali- 18 &1975Size - Classes HHS Persons 18 over
of Households 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. 1 person 20.6 7.1 49 140 17.0 0 1.00 
2. 2 persons 30.6 21.4 96 138 28.8 0.06 1.94 
3. 3 persons 17.2 18.0 114 109 17.3 0.71 2.29 
4. 4 persons 15.7 21.6 127 92 15.8 1.64 2.36 
5. 5 persons 8.6 14.7 135 79 10.4 2.54 2.46 
6. 6 persons 4.1 8.4 131 64 5.6 3.40 2.60 
7. 7 & over 3.2 8.8 124 46 5.1 5.21 3.06 
8. Total 72.87 210.6 13. 78 4. 77 62.87 1.12 2.05
~ ~
(nllions) · ($000s) (mill.) (persons) 
9. Persons per 
2.89 3.17Household 
B. Taiwan Area, end 1975
Relatives 1 Income
% shares in 1975 Persons Eer HH:
HHs Person Pee HH Per Minors Adults
Size-Classes person
of Households (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
11. 1 person 3.1 0.6 48 255 0 1.00 
12. 2 persons 5.2 2.0 76 202 0.19 1.81 
13. 3 persons 10.3 5.9 85 149 0.89 2.11 
14. 4 persons 16.9 12.8 95 125 1.75 2.25 
15. 5 persons 22.3 21.1 98 104 2.60 2.40 
16. 6 persons 18.9 21.6 104 91 3.32 2.68 
17. 7 & over 23.3 36.0 128 82 4.45 3.73 
18. 7 persons 11.3 14.9 106 80 3.95 3.05 
19. 8 persons 6.0 9.1 122 80 4.33 3.67 
20. 9 & over 6.0 12.0 144 72 5.50 5.03 
21. Total 3.01 15.88 101.81 19.32 2.64 2.63. ~ '----c~
(mill.) (000s NT) 
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Table 1 --- continued 
Notes 
Panel A --- cols 1-4: From US Bureau of the Census, Current Population 
Reports, Series P-60, no. 104, March 1977, Table 3, p. 13; and Table 15, p. 48 
Panel A, col •• 5: Calculated from US Bureau of the Census, Current Popula-
tion Reports, Series P-60, no. 72, August 1970, Table 5, p. 15 
Panel A, columns 6 and 7: The breakdown between persons under 18 and 18 
and over is given in the source for cols. 1 and 2 for the total population 
in households, not for the size-classes of households. We estimated the 
breakdown, for households beginning with the size-class of 2 and through 
that of 7 and over by using the breadown given for.families (of 2 and over) 
for the same year in US Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, 
Subject Report PC(2) 4A, Family Composition, May 1973, Table 3, pp. 7-8; 
applying the ratios to the size-classes of households; and adjusting to 
add out to the totals of below 18 and 18 and over given in the source for• 
cols. 1 and 2. 
Panel B, column 1:Taken or calculaae,d from Directorate General of Budgets, 
Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS), Report on the Survey of Personal Income 
Distribution in Taiwan Area, 1975, Taipei 1976, Table 18, pp. 164-69; 
and text Tables 11, p. 62, and 13, p. 68. 
Taiwan Area includes all of the cotmtry; Taiwan Province (to be used 
in later tables) excludes Taipei City. 
Minors are defined as persons under 21 years of age; adults as persons 
21 years old and over. 
The income data refer to "available" income, e.e., "distributed factor 
income plus current transfer receipts less current transfer expenditures." 
(p. 47). 
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and the average size of the household. The forces behind the JAA factor 
are different, in that they have to do with conditions that affect the 
degree to which related (blood, marriage, or adoption) adults live together 
or apart. While there is some association between conditions affecting 
fertility and natural increase and those affecting family togetherness or 
apartness, the distinction is clearly of analytical interest and value. 
Table 1 uses data for the United States and Taiwan because they are 
available in revealing detail, and because the two countries differ substan­
tially in the average size of the household. The evidence can be briefly 
summarized. 
First, the columns relating to average income per household and per 
person, for households grouped by size, confirm the findings noted above 
from the 1976 paper for earlier years and more countries (see footnote 3) 
on the consistent negative association between per person income and size 
of the household, contrasted with the positive association between house­
hold total income and household size (columns 3 and 4, Panels A and B). 
Second, and more directly relevant here, the difference in average 
size of household, between 2.89 persons in the United States in March 1976 
and 5.27 persons in Taiwan at end of 1975, is clearly due to a markedly 
different distribution of households by size in the two countries. In 
the United States, the proportion of small households (of 1 and 2 persons 
each) was over 50 percent; it was less than 10 percent in Taiwan. In 
contrast, the proportion of households of 6 or more persons was well 
below 10 percent in the United States, and 42 percent in Taiwan (see col. 1, 
both Panels). 
Third, the data for both countries provide a breakdown (directly or 
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indirectly) between the younger subgroup and the older, for each class of 
households grouped by size. For the United States it had to be estimated 
' for 1970 (March), the date at which the population census provides more 
detail than the annual sample survey of family incomes. For Taiwan it can 
be taken directly from the official report on the 1975 family sample survey. 
The line of division is below 18 years of age, and 18 and over for the 
United States; that for Taiwan is between below 21 years of age, and 21 
and over--so that direct comparison is difficult; but this disparity does 
not affect what appear to be two main concl~sions from the data as given. 
The first is that in the one and two person households the proportion 
of the young generation is either 0 or so small as to be negligible (see 
lines 1 and 2, col. 6, Panel A; and lines 10 and 11, col. 5, Panel B); 
and these proportions would be even lower if the line between children and 
adults were drawn not at 18 or 21 but at a lower age (as we do below, 
largely because of our interest in comparisons between developed and less 
developed countries). While the comparison here is limited to two countries, 
for our exploratory purposes the findings are sufficient to warrant, in 
further analysis, the assumption that 1 and 2 person households include 
such insignificant proportions of children that they can be taken to repres­
ent adults only. 
The second conclusion is that while the contriliution of those under 
18 or under 21 is substantial in the shift from 2 person households to those 
in larger size-classes, there is also a rise in the number of adults per 
household (see columns 6 and 7 of Panel A, lines 3-8, and columns 5 and 6 
of Panel B, lines 12-19). And while as the data stand in Table 1 direct 
comparisons of the younger groups and the adults between United States and 
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Taiwan cannot be made, it is nevertheless clear that with an average of 
persons aged 18 and over per household in the United States at 2.05 
(in 1970), and that in Taiwan in 1975 of persons 21 of age and over of 2.63 
per household, the difference between the two countries in numbers of adults 
per household makes a substantial contribution to the inter-country differ­
ences in average size of the household. And it is particularly at the 
levels of large households that the difference in contribution of disparities 
in numbers of adults becomes significant. 
The table just discussed and the comments on the findings that it 
suggests are preliminary to a full allocation of the differences in average 
size of the households between Taiwan and United States--one that would 
serve as a pattern to be applied to a variety of international and other 
comparisons. 
Before considering the allocation shown in Table 2, it may help to 
state specifically the two assumptions on which it, and all following allo­
cations, are based, and indicate the decision with reference to the divid­
ing age line between children and adults that is followed in the analysis 
below. 
One of the two assumptions is that the proportion of an age group 
defined as that of children (or that of adults) to total population can 
be identified with the proportions of the same age groups to the total 
of the population included in individual households. The two sets of 
ratios are not necessarily identical, because total population is inclusive 
of institutional groups not included under private, individual households; 
and the proportions of age groups in the institutional population are not 
usually the same as in the household population. But the data on house-
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holds, in relation to total population, used in the subsequent tables in 
Section III (mostly from the United Nations, Demographic Yearbooks, for 
selected years), show that in the vast majority of countries population 
in households is close to total population, so that the possible error 
involved in this first assu11ption is minor to the point of being negligible. 
The second of the two assumptions was noted as a finding in Table 1, 
viz. that one and two person households are taken to include such negli­
gible proportions of children that they can be assumed to be limited 
to adults alone. This proposition is subject to further check, if cross­
classifications by age and size-classes of households are found for a 
variety of other countries, at different levels of economic development; 
and it partly depends on the level of the age line that distinguishes 
between children and adults. 
In Table 2 two such lines are used--at 18 and at 15 years of age. 
This, and other possible choices, raises a question as to the full mean­
ing of the distinction. The position taken here is that the major attri­
bute of children in this analysis is their economic and other dependence, 
which makes it indispensable for them to be members of a family (barring 
institutional provisions when the family is not available, or community 
forms of care of the type involved in some of the Israeli kibbutzim). At 
the age when, within a given society, younger members of the family assume a 
share and responsibility in production, they cease to be effectively 
dependent and acquire mobility among households not theretofore feasible. 
The difficulty is that this age may differ among societies at different 
levels of economic and social development; and yet we need an identical 
dividing line, if differences arising in the comparison are to be allocated 
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Table 2 
Allocation of Differences in Average Size of Household, 
Taiwan (end 1975) and United States (March 1976) 
Children defined as below 18 Children defined as below 15 
Taiwan USA Differ. % Taiwan USA Differ. % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A. Allocation between contribution of children and adults 
1. Persons per 
household 5.27 2.89 2.38 100.0 5.27 2.89 2.38 100.0 
2. Percent of 
children 
in total 44.1 35.330.8 25.3 
3. Children per 
household 2.32 0.89 1.43 60.l 1.86 0.73 1.13 47.5-
4. Adults per 
household 2.95 2.00 0.95 39.9 3.41 2.16 1.25 52.5+ 
B. Differential contribution of 1 and 2 person households and of the 
residual (3+ person households) 
5. Percent of 1 
person households 3.1 20.6 3.1 20.6 
6. Deviation from 
higher average of 
adults per household -1.95 -1.95 -2.41 -2.41 
7. Contribution of 1 
person households 
(line. 5 x line 6) -0.060 -0.402 0.342 14.4 -0.075 -0.496 0.421 17.7 
8. Percent of 2 per­
son households 5.2 30.6 5.2 30.6 
9. Deviation -0.95 -0.95 -1.41 -1.41 
10. Contribution of 
2 person households 
(line 8 x line 9) -0.049 -0.29 0.242 10.1 -0.073 -0.431 0.358 15.0 
11. Contribution of house-




Table 2 (continued) 
Notes: 
All data, with exceptions noted below, are from Table 1. The exceptions 
are the percentages in line 2 for Taiwan, and the percentage in line 2, col. 6 
for USA. The estimates for Taiwan were calculated from the age distribution 
at end of 1975, shown in DGBAS, Statistical Yearbook, 1975 (Taipei, 1976), 
p. 4. The estimate for USA was taken from United Nations, Selected World 
Demographic Indicators by Countries, 1950-2000, Working Paper ESA/P/WP,55, 
May 1975 (mimeographed), p. 97 (medium variant). 
The numbers of children and adults per househo.ld are obtained by multi­
plying the percentages in line 2 by the entries in line 1 (columns 1-2, and 
5-6). The differences in columns 3 and 7, lines 1, 3, and 4, are by sub­
traction of the smaller household country f11om the larger. 
The contributions in Panel B of the 1 person, 2 person, and 3 and over 
person households, assumes that there are no children in the former groups 
of households (i.e. of 1 and 2 persons). The contributions are then estimated 
with reference to the number of adults per household in the country with the 
larger average household (measured in terms of total persons). 
The residual (line 10) is, fo~ the larger household country, the dif­
ference between the sum of entries in lines 7 and 10 and zero; for the 
smaller household country, the difference between the sum of entries in 
lines 7 and 10 and total shortfall in adults per household (i.e., -0.950 in 
column 3 and -1.250 in column 7). 
The percentages in columns 4 and 8 are to the total difference shown in 
line 1, columns 3 and 7•. 
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between the two factors (unless one wants to complicate the analysis 
by adding a third, the difference in age-division lines between children 
and adults). We adopted the lower dividing line at 15, since it appeared 
more suitable for the less developed countries; and this position is 
supported by the evidence in Table 6 below, which strongly suggests 
that for the LDCs the high proportions of persons in ages 15-19 among 
the urban population as compared with rural, contrasted with the much 
lower proportions of persons under 15 among the urban than among the 
rural, are indicative of rural-urban migrations among the 15-19 year 
olds. But this decision about the age-dividing line can be changed, 
within the procedure adopted, with results for the allocation that can 
be easily inferred from the comparison of the results for the two dividing 
lines in Table 2. 
Panel A of the table shows that the proportion of children in the 
total, and thus in the household population, was much larger in Taiwan 
than in the United States -- 44 compared with 31 percent for persons 
under 18, and 35 compared with 25 percent for persons under 15. The 
contribution of children, the NIC factor, to the total difference in 
the average size of the household between the two countries, was then 
1.43 or 60 percent of the total when children were defined at under 18; 
and 1.13 or 47 percent of the total when children were defined at under 15. 
In either case, a substantial component in the total difference was the 
differing number of adults per household. It contributed 40 percent of 
the total difference, when adults were defined as 18 years and over; and 
53 percent when they were defined as 15 years of age and over. Obviously, 
the higher we set the age line of division between children and adults, 
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the greater will be the proportional contribution of the children, 
i.e. the NIC factor, to the total difference in size of average household 
between two countries (or regions) and the smaller the proportional 
contribution of the JAA, or adults factor, with opposite effects of lowering 
the age line of division. 
In Panel B we proceed to distinguish the effects on differing size 
of households, in terms of adults, among those of 1 person, 2 person, 
and households of 3 and over persons (for whom only the average of adults 
per households is involved). In general, the country with the larger 
average household (in this case Taiwan) will also have a larger number of 
adults per household; and the contribution to this difference in average 
number of adults can be allocated as between 1,2, and 3+ person house­
holds --- in a manner indicated in Panel B. It may be observed that the 
greater proportion of 1 and 2 person households in the United States 
than in Taiwan makes a marked contribution to the differences in size 
of average household --- about 25 percent of the total on one assumption 
and about 33 percent on the other (see lines 7-10, col. 4 and 8); with 
that of the 3+ households being 15 and 20 percent respectively (line 11, 
colunms 4 and 8). And one should note, in particular, that whereas 
the two assumptions concerning the age-division line affect the distribu­
tion or allocation in Panel A, they have minor effects on the relative 
magnitude of the differential contribution of 1 person, 2 person, and 3+ 
person households. In terms of their proportional contribution to the 
difference in line 4, col. 3 and 7 (i.e. the JAA factor), the results 
are 36 percent and 34 percent respectively for the contribution of 1 
person households, 25 and 29 percent for that of 2 person households, and 
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39 and 38 percent for that of the 3+ person households. 
The procedure just outlined could be elaborated were the data for 
countries or regions involved in the comparison to contain cross-section 
classifications of households by number of persons as well as age­
structure of members. Such a cross-classification would permit experi­
mentation with different age levels at which the distinction between 
children and adults could be made (and distinguishing ages of adults 
at which they might become as dependent as children); and the total 
difference allocated among more subgroups of households by size of their 
adult members. But such data are not at hand, and would require a search 
in basic census or sample sources that is not feasible here. We proceed with 
allocations of the simple type indicated in Table 2 for various comparisons 
intended to illustrate, if only broadly, the variety of results that may 
be suggested. Our major interest is in evaluating the findings relating 
to both the NIC and the JAA factors for the light that they cast upon 
the relation of the conventionally available data on households (or 
family households) to the broader concept of the family as a group of 
persons sufficiently related to each other to be prone to making joint 
decisions on economic and economic.ally significant choices. 
III. Allocation of Differences in Average Size of Household--International, 
Rural-Urban, and Over-Time Comparisons 
Table 3 relates to a few countries, selected to cover a wide range 
in average size of household, rather than attempt a swmnary of a larger 
number of countries in developed and less developed regions of the world. 
This choice is due to the limitations of the coverage of United Nations 
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Table 3 
Allocations of Differences in Average Size of Household, 
Selected Countries, Recent Years 
A. Basic Data for the Individual Countries 
Sweden, Japan, Brazil, Syria, Thailand, 
1970 1970 1970 1970 1960 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average Crude Vital Rates, per 1,000, Preceding 
Three (or Two, in col. 5) Quinquennia 
1. Birth rates 14.7 17. 7 39.0 47.3 47.1 
2. Death rates 10.0 7.J 10.3 17.0 19.7 
3. Rates of natural 
increase 4.7 10.4 28.7 30.3 27.4 
4. Rates of growth of 
population 6.5- 10.0 28.8 30.3 27.7 
Data Relating to Households 
5. Persons per household 2.59 3.62 4.78 5.91 5.64 
6. Percent of total pop-
ulation below 15 20.8 24.0 42.7 45.2 44.7 
7. Children per household 0.54 0.87 2.04 2.67 2.52 
8. Adults per household 2.05 2.75 2.74 3.24 3.12 
9. Percent of 1 person 
household 25.3 13.2 2.5 5.7 2.5 
10. Percent of 2 person 
household 29.6 15.0 7.3 9.1 7.3 
B. Allocation of Differences between NIC (natural 
increase children factor) and JAA{jointness 
and apartness of adults factor) 
Japan Brazil Syria Brazil Syria Syria Thailand Thailand 
& & & & & & & & 
Sweden Sweden Sweden Japan Japan Brazil Brazil Sweden 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
11. Differences in 
persons per 
household 1.03 2.19 3.32 1.16 2.29 1.13 1.06 3.05 
12. NIC 0.33 1.50 2.13 1.17 1.80 0.63 0.48 1.98 
13. JAA 0.70 0.69 1.19 -0.Ql 0.49 0.50 0.58 1.07 
14. NIC % 32 68 64 101 79 56 45 65 
15. JAA % 68 32 36 -1 21 44 55 35 
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Table 3 (continued) 
c. Contributions of 1 and 2 Eerson households to Differ-
ences in Average Size of Households 2 Selected ComEarisons 
DifferentialLarger Smaller Percent 
households households contribution of total
(1-2) difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
JaEan-Sweden 
16. Contribution of 1
person households -0.023 -0.443 0.420 41 
17. Contribution of 2
person households -0.011 -0.222 0.211 20 
18. Residual (contribu-
tion of 3+ person
households) 0.034 -0.035 0.069 7 
Brazil-Sweden 
19. Contribution of 1
person households -0.004 -0.440 0.436 20 
20. Contribution of 2
person households -0.005 -0.219 0.214 10 
21. Residual 0.009 -0.031 0.040 2 
Syria-Sweden 
22. 1 person households -0.013 -0.567 0.554 17 
23. 2 person households -0.011 -0.367 0.356 11 
24. 3+ person households 0.024 -0.256 0.280 9 
Syria-Brazil 
25. 1 person households -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.6 
26. 2 person households -o.ou -0.009 -0.002 -0.2 
27. 3+ person households 0.024 -0.485 0.509 45 
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Table 3 (cont~nued) 
Notes: 
Lines 1-4, and 6: The entries are calculated from the United Nations 
1975 working paper cited in the notes to Table 2. The entries in lines 
1-4 are arithmetic means of the quinquennia (3 or 2) birth, death, natural 
increase, and growth rates, preceding 1970 or 1960. Those in line 6 are 
summations of the percentages of total population shown for 0-4 and 5-14 
age groups. 
Lines 5, 9, and 10: Taken from UN summaries of data on distributions 
of households by size (number of person classes), in Demographic Yearbook, 
1973 (New York 1974), Table 24, pp. 396 ff; and Demographic Yearbook, 1971 
(New York, 1972), Table 11, pp. 396 ff. 
All other entries by calculation from the basic data in lines 5, 6, 9, 
and 10. For the procedure see the notes to Table 2 above and the discussion 
in the text. 
-18-
data on size and size-distribution of households and in the lack of 
comparability specifically in the definition and distinction of one-
4person households. This latter limitation is particularly restrictive 
in its bearing upon an allocation of the type outlined in Table 2, 
since it bars reliance on the estimate of effects of the larger propor­
tion of one-person households usually found in the more developed countries 
with a lower average size of household (but also found in a large number 
of LDCs). 
Panel A includes for the five selected countries not only data 
relating to size of households, but also on the broader demographic 
characteristics--the percent proportion of persons under 15 in total 
population (line 6), the crude vital rates (birth, death, and natural 
increase, lines 1-3), and the average rate of increase per thousand - all 
these rates being averages over the 15 year period preceding the date 
of line 6 (and of the statistics on size of household). The rate of 
population growth, in line 4, can differ from that of the rate of natural 
increase, in line 3, because of a substantial balance of in-and-out 
migration. But the difference is significant only for Sweden, reflecting 
a substantial in-migration into the country that would, presumably, 
lower somewhat the percentage proportion of children, i.e. of population 
under 15 years of age. 
For the small sample covered here there is close positive associa­
tion between rates of natural increase and growth rates of population, 
on one hand, and the proportions of children under 15 in total population. 
Since the differences in birth rates are far more dominant than those in 
death rates, it is birth rate differentials that are largely responsible 
for the differentials in rates of natural increase and growth rates of 
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population--so that it is the fertility differentials that largely 
account for the differences in the proportions of children under 15 in 
total population. The set of connections observed here for the small 
number of countries would be found also in the larger universe, so long 
as in the countries included the dominance of birth rate differentials in 
differences in rates of natural increase prevails. 
The procedure followed rests on binary comparisons. In Panel B the 
allocation is between the children (NIC factor)and the jointness of 
adults factor (JAA), and the dominant impression is of a wide variety 
of combinations. Thus, in comparing Sweden and Japan, with a difference 
between the averages of 1.03 persons, we find that the children's propor­
tion contributes only about a third of the total difference--two thirds 
being due to the greater jointness of adults in Japan (col. 1 of Panel B). 
This suggests a distinct tendency toward larger adult households in Japan. 
In comparing Sweden and Brazil--with a much wider disparity in the average 
size of households in the two countries--the contribution of the NIC factor 
is absolutely and proportionately much wider (col. 2, of Panel A); the 
contribution of the JAA factor is absolutely the same, but proportionately 
much smaller than in the Sweden-Japan comparison. Finally, in the 
comparison between Sweden and Syria--with a still larger disparity in 
average size of the household--the NIC factor is dominant, and yet there 
is also a substantially larger contribution of the JAA factor (of 1.19) 
persons per HH, compared with about 0.7 in the Sweden-Japan and Sweden­
Brazil comparisons, see col. 3 of Panel B). Apparently, the international 
differences in patterns of household and family are substantial not only 
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with respect to differing numbers of children associated with differen­
tial fertility, but also in the patterns of joint or separate living 
of adult members. Some countries, such as those represented by Japan, 
Syria, and Thailand, show more of a tendency toward joint residence 
by adult members than appears to be true of Brazil and Sweden. 
There is also considerable variety in the relative contribution 
of the differing proportions of 1,2, and 3+ person households to the 
JAA component (Panel C). In the first three of the four binary compari­
sons shown, the contributions of the 1 and 2 person households are 
proportionally high---accounting together for most of the JAA component 
in the total difference; the relative share of the difference in 
adults per household among the larger households (of 3+ members) is 
minor. But this is not true of the fourth comparison (Syria-Brazil), 
in which all of the JAA component is accounted for by the larger 
number of adults in the Syrian households of 3 persons and over. 
The findings are limited, with the number of countries kept 
small to obviate too many binary comparisons. But they are varied 
enough to suggest interesting variability among countries, not only 
between the developed and less developed groups, but also within the 
two major divisions, with respect to the relative role of the children 
and the jointness of adults factors, as well as with respect to the 
source of contribution to the JAA component of households with differ­
ing numbers of persons or adults. There are clearly institutional 
differences in the structures of households, over and above the major 
effects of fertility and rate of natural increase so clearly associated 
with levels of economic development. These differences could be 
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brought out more clearly with more intensive analysis of the sex 
and age structure of households in selected countries, with particular 
attention to the grouping of households in terms of adult members, 
for countries otherwise comparable with respect to level of economic 
development and the magnitude of the NIC component in the difference 
in size between average households. 
Such more intensive study is beyond the limits of the present 
exploratory essay. We turn now to data relating to proportions of 
children under 15 in total population, which are available for a 
large number of countries on a worldwide basis, and can be summarized, 
as of a given date (we use 1955 and 1970), to indicate the possible 
contribution of this factor (NIC) to differences in average size of 
household between large developed and less developed regions (Table 4). 
The comparison is limited to market economies. 
One intriguing finding in Panel A is that both in 1955 and 1970 
the percentage proportions of children under 15 differ little among 
the major LDC regions in lines 1-4, col. 2, while even the absolute, 
let alone relative differences in this proportion among the developed 
regions are much more marked--between the older countries of developed 
Europe and Japan, on the one hand, and United States and other over­
seas offshoots of Europe, on the other. This is a reflection of the 
rather uniformly high fertility and rates of natural increase among 
the major less developed regions (at least at the two dates indicated), 
despite substantial differences in per capita income between say Latin 
America in line 4 and Asia in line 1. It also reflects the higher 
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Table 4 
Proportions of Population under 15, 1955 and 1970, and Approximate 
Allocation of Differences in Size of Average Household, 1970, Less 
Developed and Developed Market Economies 
Panel A. Proportions under 15 and Growth Rates of Population, 
1955 arid 1970 












1. East and Middle 
South Asia 
40 •.3 43.4 712.1 1,024.7 24.4 
2. Middle East 41.9 43.9 108.8 162.2 27.0 
3. Subsaharan 
Africa 
43.7 44.2 169.2 241.7 24.1 
4. Latin America 43.2 44.4 159.6 271.2 36.0 
5. All LDCs above 41.4 43.7 1,150 1,700 26.4 
6. Developed 
Europe 
23.8 24.2 249.7 282.0 8.1 
7. Japan 30.2 24.0 89.8 104.3 10.0 
8. United States 29.5 28.3 165.9 204.9 14.2 
9. Other Overseas 31.0 29.9 27.1 36.8 20.6 
10. All DCs above 27.2 25.8 532.5 628.0 11.0 
Panel B. Allocation of Differences in Size of Average Household 

















Persons per HH, estimate 
% under 15 
Persons under 15 per HH 
Adults per HH 
% of 1 person HHs 
(approximate) 
Contribution of line 15 
% of 2 person HHs 
(approximate) 































The data is Panel A are all from United Nations, Working Paper, 
ESA/P/WP.55 (New York, May 1975, mimeo). Eastern and Middle South 
Asia is the sum of the two regions so indicated; Middle East in the 
sum of West South Asia and North Africa; Subsaharan Africa is the 
sum of three regions--Eastern, Middle and Western Africa (omitting 
Southern); Latin America is the total excluding the temperate region. 
The growth rates in column 5 are· rerived directly from the two popula­
tion totals in columns 3 and 4, and therefore reflect net interregional 
migration. For the developed regions, the composition is as follows: 
developed Europe includes Northern and Western Europe, plus Italy; 
and the "other overseas" are the sum of Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. 
The calculations in Panel B proceed in the manner shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 above, but use approximate values in line 11, 15, 
and 17. These are based, in part, on the summary distribution of 
households by size for LDCs and DCs in early and late 1960s (Table 
10, p. 385 in my paper, "Fertility Differentials Between Less Developed 
and Developed Regions: Components and Implications," in Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 119, no. 5, October 1975), 
partly on more recent data for individual countries--with crude allo­
wance for the decline in size of households in DCs and rise in the 
proportion of 1 and 2 person households by 1970. 
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fertility and rate of natural increase among the overseas offshoots 
of Europe, despite their generally higher per capita income, than in 
Europe or in Japan. 
The other interesting finding is that not only were the propor­
tions of children under 15 substantially higher among the less developed 
regions, in lines 1-5, than among the developed, in lines 6-10, thus 
contributing significantly to the larger average size of households 
in the LDCs than in the DCs; but also this excess in the proportion of 
children among the LDCs widened in the fifteen years preceding 1970. 
The proportion rose between 1955 and 1970 for each of the four LDC 
regions, most strikingly among the populous Asian countries in line 1, 
while there were substantial declines in three out of the four developed 
regions. The disparity in the proportions of children under 15 among 
the LDC and DC groups widened from 14.2 percentage points in 1955 
to 17.9 percentage points in 1970, and one could assume that with the 
marked decline in fertility in the DCs after 1970 the widening 
continued to date. 
Panel B attempts to translate the evidence in Panel A into a full 
allocation of the difference between LDCs and DCs in size of the average 
household, about 1970, between the two large groups of market economies. 
Using the 1975 paper cited in footnote 3 above, which suggested for the 
early and mid-1960s average sizes of about 5 and 3.3 respectively, we 
assumed the average size in LDCs and DCs in 1970 to be roughly 5.0 and 
3.0 respectively, while on the basis of scattered evidence in the 1971 
and 1973 Demographic Yearbooks on size-distribution of households in 
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a number of developed and less developed market economies, we set 
the proportions of 1 and 2 person households at 5 and 10 percent 
respectively for LDCs compared with 20 and 30 percent proportions for 
these two groups of smaller households in the DCs. More• detailed 
data might change these assumptions by a couple of percentage points, 
but not sufficiently to affect the major conclusions, and the same can 
be said of the effects of more elaborate approximations to the average 
size of households for the two wide groups of regions. 
The allocation for these two groups in 1970 shows about seven­
tenths of the difference associated with the higher proportion of 
children under 15 in the LDCs, and three-tenths due to the greater 
jointness of adults within the LDC households. This is a plausible 
result, but one must note the possible wide variation in these propor­
tions not only for pairs of individual countries, but also for some 
pairs of wider regions selected among the LDCs and DCs in Table 4. The 
results relating to contributions of the differing proportions of 
1,2, and 3+ person households (lines 16, 18 and 19) are clearly depend­
ent upon the differences in proportions assumed in lines 15 and 17, but 
the dominance of the differential contribution of 1 person households 
seems plausible--if there be no incomparability in the definitions of 
one-person households between DCs and LDCs. 
In turning now to differences in average size of household between 
rural and urban populations within the same country, we are limited 
to the small number of countries for which the data are at hand from 
international compilations (Table 5). But there are some intriguing 
and suggestive findings. They become more striking if we emit the 
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Table 5 
Differences in Size of Average Household between Rural 
and Urban Population, Selected Countries 
'.France Finland Japan Chile Ecuador Pakistan Philippines 
1968 1970 1970 1970 1962 1970 1970-1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Structure by Age
i 
1. % of urban HHs in total 71.4 56.5+ 75.1 77.7 34.0 27.2 30.1 
Persons per Household 
2. Rural 3.30 3.38 4.09 5.52 5.00 5. 77 5.83 
3. Urban 3.09 2.69 3.46 4.97 5.36 5.64 5.91 
4. Difference (2-3) 0.21 0.69 0.63 0.55 -0.36 0.13 -0.08 
% Under 15 in Total Population 
1
5. Rural 24.0 25.2 24.9 44.6 45.7 43.8 53.51 
6. Urban 23.6 23.4 23.6 39.1 43.9 42.5 49.1 
Persons under 15 2 per HH 
17. Rural 0.79 0.85 1.02 2.46 2.28 2.53 3.121 
8, Urban 0.73 0.63 0.81 1.94 2.35 2.40 2.90 
9. Difference (7-8) Q.06 0.22 0.21 0.52 -0.07 0.13 0.22 
10. Line 9 as% of line 4 29 32 33 95 nc 100 
Persons 2 15 & over 2 per HH 
1
11. Rural 2.51 2.53 3.07 3.06 2. 72 3.24 2. 711 
12. Urban 2.36 2.06 2.65 3.03 3.01 3.24 3.01 
13. Difference (11-12) 0.15 0.47 0.42 0.03 -0.29 0 -0.30 
14. Line 13 as % of line 4 71 68 67 5 nc 0 nc 
% 1 person HHs 
15. Rural 19.4 18.4 7.8 6.0 6.4 5.4 1. 9 
16. Urban 20.6 28.2 14.9 5.4 7.5- 9,3 1.7 
% 2 Person HHs 
17. Rural 27.1 20.6 13.1 8.8 12.1 8.3 7.3 
18 Urban 26.2 23.3 15.6 11. 8 10.5+ 8.1 6.0 
(1) -- relates to children under 18 and adults aged 18 and over. 
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Table 5--continued 
B. Contribution of 1, 2, and 3+ Person Households 
Rural Urban Difference 
% of Contrib. % of Contrib. Differ. % of total 
HHs HHs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
France 
19. 1 person HHs 19.4 -0.293 20.6 -0.311 0.018 9 
20. 2· II II 27.1 -0.014 26.2 -0.013 -0.001 -1 
II II21. 3+ 0.307 0.174 0.133 63 
Finland 
22. 1 person HHs 18.4 -0.282 28.2 -0.426 0.144 21 
II II23. 2 20.6 -0.109 23.3 -0.123 0.014 2 
II II 4524. 3+ 0.391 0.079 0.312 
Japan 
25. 1 person HHs 7.8 -0.016 14.9 -0.031 0.015 2 
II II26. 2 13.1 -0.014 15.6 -0.017 0.003 1 
27. 3+ II II 0.030 -0.372 0.402 64 
Chile 
28. 1 person HHs 6.0 -0.012 5.4 -0.011 -0.001 -0.2 
II II29. 2 8.8 -0.009 1L8 -0.013 0.004 0.7 
30. 3+ II II 0.021 -0.006 0.027 4.9 
Pakistan 
31. 1 person HHs 5.4 -0.012 9.3 -0.021 0.009 7 
32. 2 II " 8.3 -0.010 8.1 -0.010 0 0 
II II33. 3+ 0.022. 0.031 -0.009 -7 
Notes 
For all countries except the Philippines, the underlying data are from 
the United Nations; ·nemographic Yearbook 1971 (New York, 1972), Tables 11 
and 12, and Demographic Yearbook, 1973 (New York, 1974), Tables 24 and 26. 
The data for the Philippines are from Bureau of Census and Statistics, Family 
Income and Expenditures: 1971 (Manila 1975), Tables 3 and 50. The data 
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Table 5 Notes--corttirttied 
in this report were utilized fairly intensively in the 1976 paper referred 
to in footnote 3, and the earlier paper of which the 1976 paper was a 
revised version (referred to in the 1976 paper). The notes below refer 
largely to the six countries, excluding the Philippines. 
The distribution of households by size (needed for Panel A) and 
between rural and urban is limited to the household population. The 
proportion of population under 15 to total may.refer to the total including 
some institutional population. 
For the procedure involved in Panel B see the notes to the preceding 
tables. 
For brief definitions of the urban population (defining the rural as 
a residual) see notes to Table 5 in the 1971 Demographic Yearbook, pp. 154-
158. The definitions differ from country to country, but relate either to 
capitals of country and provinces, and administrative centers, or to 
agglomerations above a certain population level, or to presence of urban. 
administrations and institutions. 
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data for Chile from the discussion, because of some peculiarities 
in the latter that are not easily explicable. Thus, it is puzzling 
to find the proportion of urban households to their total number to 
be higher in Chile than in the three economically more advanced 
countries in columns 1-3 (see line 1). It is also puzzling to find 
the average size of households in Chile (in 1970), at 5.1, to be 
as large as the average for Ecuador, a far less developed country 
(in 1962). 
The differences in average size of households illustrated in 
Table 5 were naturally of much narrower range than is true among 
the DCs and LDCs in Table 4, or the individual selected countries 
in Table 3. After all, the rural and urban populations are parts 
of one and the same country, and their demographic and economic 
patterns are not likely to differ as much as•in separate countries 
that can be at widely different levels within an extensive internation­
al range. And yet the rural-urban differences in average size of 
households, and in distribution of households by size, are suffi­
ciently large to matter. 
As we observe these differences, and exclude Chile from the 
comparison, we find that rural households in the three developed 
countries in columns 1-3 exceed in size the urban households by 
substantial margins in Finland and in Japan, and by a smaller but 
still perceptible margin in France (see line 4). In the thre~ less 
developed countries, in columns 5-7, there is no such consistent 
excess in size of the average rural household over the urban; indeed, 
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in Ecuador (in 1962) and in the Philippines (in 1970-71), the rural 
household is smaller than the urban, and in Pakistan the difference in 
favor of the rural household is slight indeed (being less than 3 percent). 
This contrasting finding relating to differences in size of rural­
urban households in the developed and less developed countries in Table 5 
is not due to underlying differences in proportions of children under 15 
between the rural and urban populations. These proportions (with one for 
children under 18 for the Philippines) are shown for rural and urban 
populations in lines 5 and 6, and those in line 5 are uniformly higher 
than those in line 6--the excess being distinctly narrower for the three 
developed countries in columns 1-3 than for the three less developed 
countries in columns ·5_7. It follov.5 that the failure of the average 
household in the rural population of the less developed countries to 
exceed that in the urban must be due to the greater contribution of the 
adults (i.e. persons 15 and over) in the urban communities. And it may 
well be that this result is associated with the greater relative influx 
of these adults into the urban centers of the less developed countries 
in recent years than would be true of the populations of developed 
countries, with these migrants becoming members of larger households 
rather than forming recognizalbe one-person households. 5 This hypothesis 
cannot be adequately tested without much more data on size and structure 
of households, for the urban and rural populations of a much larger 
number of countries than we could readily find for Table 5. 
The other tentative finding is suggested by the data.for the 
three developed countries in Panel B. With differences in average size 
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between rural and urban households fairly substantial, and yet the differ­
ences in proportions of children under 15 in rural and urban populations 
quite small, it follows that differences in the numbers of adults per 
household, produced by differing proportions of households with different 
number of adult members, must account for a large part of the rural-urban 
differences in total number of persons per household. And indeed Panel B 
for France, Finland, and Japan shows that for these countries it was the 
contribution of the 3+ person households that loomed largest in accounting 
for the total rural-urban difference. Thus; unlike most of the internation­
al comparisons, the intra-national comparisons between countryside and city 
in the developed countries show that the countryside preserves large propor­
tions of the JAA factor that is lost in the urban communities--and is, in 
this respect, a greater preserver of the older traditions, even though the 
countryside appears not to retain the tradition with respect to the NIC 
factor, or the much lower proportions of 1 and 2 person households. But 
again, the hypothesis should be checked with a wider array of countries 
and data. 
Since the few countries used in Table 5 all show a higher proportion 
of children under 15 in the rural than in the urban population, and we 
have data readily available on these proportions for much larger number 
of countries, it seemed of interest here to consider these data with a 
greater coverage--and particularly to observe at the same time the propor­
tions of persons 15 through 19, again for the rural and urban population 
separately, to see whether these proportions are affected by the rural­
urban migration. This latter may affect even children under 15, but it 
could hardly have significant effects, particularly compared with those 
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on the older age group (or groups). 
Table 6 summarizes the relevant information for a large number of 
countries, at different years but mostly for early and mid-1960s. 6 The 
first and obvious conclusion is that the percentage proportions of children 
under 15 are consistently higher in the rural than in the urban popula­
tions, in developed and in less developed countries--although there are 
some exceptions (for the LDC panel, this finding is true of 40 out of 49 
countries with most exceptions in Africa; for the DC panel, of 11 out of 
13 countries). 
A second, and more interesting finding, relates to the comparative 
proportions of persons 15 through 19 years of age (columns 6-8). For the 
less developed regions, these proportions are higher in the urban popula­
tion--thus reversing the sign of the difference in the pr~portions of 
children under 15; and this excess proportion of the 15-19 years age 
group among the urban population is found quite consistently (42 out of 
the 49 countries, three of the exceptions in countries in Subsaharan Africa 
and three of them in Latin America). By contrast, developed Europe and 
the United States show a slight shortage of proportions of the 15-19 
group in the urban relative to the rural population (lines 6 and 7, 
columns 6 and 7, all eight countries in Europe showing this relation), 
The large weight of these countries in lines 6 and 7 combined with rather 
limited differentials in the other overseas countries, results in a 
definitely lower proportion of the 15-19 group in the urban population 
than in the rural in the weighted averages for the DC group in line 10. 
It should be remembered that the proportions shown are ratios to 
current population, a mixture of different age cohorts, of age groups 
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Table 6 
Average Proportions(%) of Groups below 15 and 15-19 years 
of Age in Rural and Urban Populations, Less Developed and 
Developed Regions, Late 1950s and early 1960s 
No. of % of % of population % of population 15-19 
count. rural below 15 yea.rs of age 
pop. Rural Urban No. of Rural Urban No. of 
agreements agreements 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LDC regions (market economies) 
1. East and middle 9 81.7 43.8 40.3 8 8.6 10.2 8 
south Asia 
9.1 92. Middle East 9 63.4 45.8 43.3 7 7.9 
103. Subsaharan 13 84.8 42.3 40.8 8 7.0 8.0 
Africa 
154. Latin America 18 60.9 47.2 41.1 17 9.4 10.3 
(ex. temperate) 
5. All LDCs 49 77.2 44.3 40.8 40 8.4 9.8 42 
(cols 2-4 and f 
6-7 weighted) 
DC regions or countries (market economies) 
6 • Developed 8 39.9 25.8 22.8 7 8.3 7.8 8 
Europe 
7. United States 1 28.5 33.4 30.1 1 8.3 7.0 1 
(1960) 
28.7 24.2 1 10.0 ll,6 08. Japan (1965) 1 31.9 
9. Other overseas 3 26.7 36.6 30.0 2 8.4 0,7 0 
countries 
10. All DCs (cols 2-4 13 33,5,... 29.8 26.3 11 8.6 8.1 9 




The entries in columns 5 and 8 denote the number of countries in 
which the sign of relations of columns 3-4 and 6-7 is in agreement with 
that shown by the averages for LDCs and DCs in the corresponding columns 
in lines 5 and 10. 
The weights for the LDC regions are 60, 10, 15, and 15--for lines 
1-4 respectively, and are suggested by columns 3 and 4 on Panel A of 
Table 4. The weights for the DC regions are 40, 40, 15 and 5, for lines 
6-9 respectively, and are suggested by total population shown in Panel A 
of Table 4. 
All data are from the comprehensive Table 6, pp. 166-407 of United 
Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1970 (New York 1971). The% proportions 
were always calculated to the total excluding unallocated by age, whenever 
the latter were shown. The entries here are unweighted arithmetic means 
of the proportions for the individual countries within each region. 
The following countries (with year for which the data were given) were 
included. Line 1: Cambodia (1962); Ceylon (1963); India (1961); Indonesia 
(1961); S. Korea (1966); Nepal (1961); Pakistan (1961); Iran (1966). 
Line 2: Iraq (1965); Jordan (1961); Syria (1960); Turkey (1960); Algeria 
(1966); Libya (1964); Morocco (1960); Tunisia (1966); Egypt (1960). 
Line 3: Central African Republic (1959-60); Congo (1955-7); Ghana (1960); 
Mali (1960-1); Nigeria (1963); Zambia (1963); Gabon (1961); Namibia (1960); 
Chad (1964); Congo PR (1960-1); Dahomey (1961); Guinea (1955); Togo 
(1958-60). Line 4: Costa Rica (1963); Dominican Republic (1960); El 
Salvador (1961); Guatemala (1964); Honduras (1961); Jamaica (1960); 
-35-
Table 6 Notes--continued 
Mexico (1960); Nicaragua (1963); Panama (1960); Brazil (1960); Chile 
(1960); Colombia (1964); Ecuad_or (1962); Paraguay (1962); Peru (1961); 
Venezuela (1961); Trinidad and Tobago (1960); Guyana (1960). In general, 
· we tried to include as many LDCs as possible--excluding only those in 
which the proportion of urban population was well below 10 percent. 
For the developed countries, the following were included. Line 6: 
Denmark (1965); Finland (aiverage 1960 and 1970, the .latter reported in 
Demographic Yearbook.J 1973 (New York 1974); France (1968); Netherlands 
(1968, semiurban included with rural); Norway {average of 1960 and 1970); 
Sweden (1965); Switzerland {average for 1960 and 1970); England and 
Wales (1961). Line 9: Canada (1960); Australia (1966); New Zealand (1961). 
For brief definitions of "urban" {and thus of rural as a residual) 
for a large number of countries see notes to Table 5 of the same 1970 
Demographic Yearbook, pp. 159-165. See also the note on definition of 
"urban" in Table 5 above. 
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that are survivals of cohorts originating in different past years. This 
_complicates comparing shares of the age group of say 15-19 with those of 
10-14, for the 15-19 group at a given date is part of the cohort born 
15 to 20 years ago, whereas the 10-14 group is part of the cohort born 10 
to 15 years ago. Assuming constant fertility and mortality (by age groups) 
and a positive rate of natural increase, we expect the proportions of 
successive five-age groups in a given population to decline--partly because 
of different spans of mortality, partly because of the rises in base to 
which the rate of natural rate of increase is applied in a growing popula­
tion. And, of course, any changes in vital rates, aggregate and by age, 
would complicate further the comparison of age-group proportions in current 
population. But all of this does not bar the inference that if we find, 
in the case of LDCs, a reversal of the type observed, in the comparative 
proportions in rural and urban population of the under 15 and 15-19 age 
groups, the only plausible explanation (barring unsuspected major biases 
and errors in the basic data) is that there has been sufficient rural­
urban migration in the 15-19 group to reverse the urban shortfall in 
this group that would have otherwise occurred. And the parallel inference 
for the different finding in the developed countries of Europe and in 
the United States is that such rural-urban migration in the 15-19 age 
group was not sufficient to reverse the disparity in proportions that 
prevailed in the groups under 15 years of age. Thus, one should refer 
back to our earlier discussion concerning the age-line dividing children 
from adults; and repeat our argument that it is the evidence concerning 
the possibly substantial migration among the 15-19 group from the country­
side to the cities, particularly in the less developed countries, that led 
us to set the division line at 15. 
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Finally, one should add that the lack of evidence on the substantial 
migration from the countryside to the cities of the 15-19 group in the 
developed countries is not true of the older prime ages in the labor 
force. In the paper referred to in footnote 5, Table 10, p. 21 shows 
proportions to rural and urban population, of men and women (given separ­
ately) aged 15 through 49, these being treated as both childbearing and 
working ages (prone to migration) for women and working ages (again prone 
to migration) for men. Combining the percentage shares for men and women, 
and using the regional averages shown in the table, we obtain the following 
summary: 
Regions No. of %Proportions, 15-149 
(comparable countries Rural Pop. - Urban- Pop. 
to Table 6) (1) (2) (3) 
1. East and MS Asia 10 44.8 49.1 
2. Middle East 8 41.2 44.2 
3. Subsaharan Africa 13 46.5 52.1 
4. Latin America 
(including temperate) 17 42.4 47.3 
5. LDCs, weighted 
(0-. 60;0 .10;0.15; 
0 .15--succ. lines) 44.3 48.8 
6. Devel. Europe 8 46.8 48.2 
7. Japan 1 47.3 55.8 
8. U.S. and Canada 2 43..5 47.3 
9. Australia-NZ 2 45.3 46.6 
10. DCs weighted 
(0.40; 0.15; 0.425; 
0.025--succ. lines) 46.3 48.9 
The evidence is clear th~t for the broader span of the working ages, 
the relevant proportions in urban population are greater than in ruwal 
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population in both less developed countries and the developed countries-­
reflecting the rural-urban internal migration, which, for obvious reasons, 
tends to be concentrated in the working ages. The different finding in 
Table 6 for the 15-19 age group suggests that such migration becomes signi­
ficant at an earlier age in the less developed countries than in the 
developed--a reflection possibly of greater pressures toward early employ­
ment and earlier beginning of working life in the less developed than in 
the developed countries. 
In addition to the differences in the age-incidence of the rural-
urban migration between the developed and less developed countries, stressed 
above as most relevant to our topic, there are interesting sex-differences 
touched upon in the paper referred to in footnote 6. In connection with 
Table 10, p. 21, the text comments that •• "in Asia and Africa the internal 
migration toward the cities is concentrated on men, while that in Latin 
America and the DCs appears concentrated on women" (p. 22). Such sex­
differences in propensity to rural-urban migration would be of importance 
in a full analysis.of the size and structure of households of countries 
at different levels of economic development. But we cannot pursue this 
topic further here. 
In turning now to the last type of comparison of size and size distri­
bution of households, over fairly long periods of the demographic transition 
and change associated with economic growth, we use data for the United 
States as an illustration. These cover, with wide gaps, a long period 
from 1790, with more details relating to the 20th century; and the summary 
findings are presented in Table 7. Over this long period, the area and 
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Table 7 
Allocation of Changes in Size of Average Household, 
United States, Selected Years, 1790-1970 
A. Allocation by Age Structure (below 15 and 15 & over) 
Persons % under 15 Persons Persons Changes between Success. 
per HH in below 15 15 + dates 
population per HH per HH Col. 1 Col. 3 Col. 4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. 1790 5.79 49.9 2.89· 2.90 
2. 1850 5.55 41.5+ 2.30 3.25 -0.24 -0.59 +0.35 
3. 1890 4.93 35.5+ 1.75 3.18 -0.62 -0.55 -0.07 
4. 1910 4.54 32.1 1.46 3.08 -0.39 -0.29 -0.10 
5. 1930 4.11 29.4 1.21 2.90 -0.43 -0.25 -0.18 
6. 1950 3.37 26.9 0.91 2.46 -0.74 -0.30 -0.44 
7. 1970 3.14 28.5- 0,89 2.25 -0.23 .-0.02 -0.21 
Wider Intervals 
8. 1790 to 1890 -0.86 -1.14 +o.28 
9. 1890 to 1930 -0.82 -0.54 -0.28 
10. 1930 to 1970 -0.97 -0.32 -0.65 
11. 1890 to 1970 -1.79 -0.86 -0.83 
B. Contributions of 1, Jz and 3+ Person Households 2 
to·Changes·over·the·wider·rntervals 
Contribution to Decline Columns 3-5 as 
% in HHs in Eersons Eer HH % of Total Decline 
1 pers. 2 pers. (rises marked+) (rises marked-) 
HHs HHs :1 2 3+ 1 2 3+ 
pers. pers. pers. pers. pers. pers. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
12. 1790 3.7 7.8 
13. 1890 3.6 13.2 +0.002 0.049 +0.327 -0.2 5.7 -38.0 
14. 1930 7.9 23.4 0.094 0.120 0.066 11.5 14.6 8.0 
15. 1970 17.1 28.8 0.255 0.048 0.347 26.3 4.9 35.8 




All the underlying data are taken, or estimated, from U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times 
to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1, Washington, D.C. 1975. Persons 
per household are from Series A-288-319, p. 41. The proportions of 1 and 
2 person households, for the years indicated, are from Series A-335-349, 
p. 42. The proportions of population below 15 ·years of age, for the years 
beginning in 1890, are from Series A-119-134, pp. 15ff. 
The only entry that had to be estimated was the% proportion of 
population below 15 years of age in 1790. The earliest date for which 
this proportion could be calculated for total population was 1850 (when 
it was 41.5+ percent, compared with 35.5- in 1890). The estimation was 
based on movement of the proportions for the white population (available 
for below 15 group back to 1830, and for the below 16 group back to 1800)., 
It was done by calculating the relative changes in the percentages of the 
available younger group, and extrapolating back the 1890 proportion the 
accumulated relative change. Since the proportion of whites, below 16 
years of age, to total white population was as high as 50 percent in 1800, 
the estimate used in line 1, col. 2, cannot be much off the mark. 
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population of the country grew dramatically; some discontinuity is intro­
duced by inclusion of Hawaii and Alaska in 1960; and there are minor 
incomparabilities in inclusion and exclusion of institutional households 
(see the notes in the source cited in Table 7). But the broad findings, 
over the long period, are not likely to be much affected by these statisti­
cal inadequacies. They are, however, affected by the substantial net 
immigration inflows that began in the 1830s, and continued with some 
interruptions and changes in volume to recent decades. 
Over the almost two centuries span, the average size of the house­
hold declined from 5.8 persons in 1790 to 3.1 in 1970; and as Table 1 
above shows, it declined further to 2.9 in March 1976. But the rate of 
decline was relatively moderate over the first six decades, and began 
accelerating only after the Civil War. The decline over the first six 
decades was just about 4 percent; over the next sixty years, from 1850 
to 1910, almost 20 percent; over the following sixty years, from 1910 
to 1970, almost 40 percent. 
This acceleration of the rate of decline in the average size of the 
household was accompanied by a marked shift in the relative contribution 
to this decline of the NIC, the natural increase-children factor, and of 
the JAA, jointness or apartness of adults factor. Over the first six 
decades, the decline in the proportion of children under 15 was sufficient 
to more than outweigh the decline in total persons per household--with the 
contribution of the adults serving to increase rather than diminish the 
total of persons per household. The result may be due in part to effect 
of immigration, the latter being more concentrated in ages above 15. By 
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1850, the proportion· of foreign born (whites and free Negroes) to total 
population was 2.26 million out of a total of 23.2 million, or 9.8 percent. 
If we were to assume that in both 1790 and 1850, all children under 15 
were native born, and neglect the proportion of adult foreign born in 
1790, the percentage of under 15 in 1850 would be raised from 41.5 to 
46.0 (i.e., divided by 0.902). On this extreme assumption, the average 
of children under 15 in 1850 would be 2.55 per household, leaving 3.00 
of adults per households--still a slight rise from the average of 2.90 
in 1790. On the other hand, the marked decline in proportion of children 
under 15 is confirmed by the data on fertility and number of children 
under 5 per 1,000 white women of childbearing ages, both available 
for the span from 1800 to 1850. 
This interesting case of the jointness of adults contributing to 
an increase over time in the size of the household is limited to the 
first six decades (and may have ended earlier). After that date, the 
declining rate of natural increase continues to contribute to the d~clinc 
in the average size of the household, but in diminishing proportions, 
and becomes negligible in the last two decades, between 1950 and 1970, 
whereas the contribution of the jointness, of adults factor, or rather of 
the growing apartness of adults, is increasingly important in the total 
reduction in the size of the average household. Thus, over 1930-1970 
span, the JAA factor accounts for two thirds of the total decline, the 
children-factor for only a third. 
Panel B, which analy~es the contributions of the different propor­
tions of 1, 2, and 3+ person households to the total JAA component, is 
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based on size distributions of households, and the latter are not avail­
able for any year between 1790 and 1890. Even so, the comparison of the 
percentage proportions of 1 and 2 person households in lines 12 and 13, 
columns 1 and 2, demonstrates very little change in the shares of the 
1 person household, and a small absolute (although large relative) rise 
over the century in the share of 2 person households. The analysis indi­
cates that it was the rise in the adults average for households of 3 and 
over persons that contributed to the positive sign of the JAA factor in 
the movement from 1790 to 1890 (see line 13, columns 3-5). The further 
evidence in Panel Bon the periods following 1890 indicate that the major 
contributions to the decline in adult persons per household were made by 
the rising percentages of the 1 person households, and the reduction in 
average of adults per 3+ person households--with the rather moderate share 
of the contribution of the 2 person households. Thus it is the increase 
in the proportion of household at one extreme tail, viz. 1 person house­
holds, and the decrease in the p~Oportions at the other extreme tail--
to the right of the size distribution well above the 3 and 4 person house­
hold --that may be the major contributors· to the decline- in numbers 
of adults per household, particularly after the 1930s. 
Table 7 covers a range in size of average hou~ehold that is almost 
as wide as that found in current cross...sections among developed and less 
developed countries in the selected sample in Table 3. And while the 
record is that for a rapidly growing country affected by immigration, it 
is not unlikely that the broad findings on the shift from the contribu­
tion of declining fertility and natural increase via the declining propor-
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tion of children under 15 to that of increasing apartness of adults in 
the more recent decades would be found in other developed countries. 
Testing this hypothesis would require comparable long-term data on size 
and size-structure of households, as well as those age distributionson 
of population, for other developed countries. 
The findings in Section III suggest that the contribution of the 
factor connected with the jointness and apartness of adults to the total 
disparity in average size of households is substantial--particularly in 
rural-urban comparisons within developed countries and in comparisons 
over time for recent periods for a developed country like the United 
States. The JAA factor is also of some weight in the differences in 
average size of households in international cross-section comparisons. 
With 1 and 2 person households comprised predominantly of adults, we 
should examine their other characteristics for whatever light may be 
shed on the contributions of these small households to differences in 
size of households, at least for international comparisons. 
IV. Small and Large Households, by Age and Sex of Head: An Illustrative 
Comparison. 
Here we revert to a comp~rison of the detailed data available for 
the United States and Taiwan, except that unlike our illustration in 
Section I (Tables 1 and 2), the one here is based at first on data for Taiwan 
Province (excluding Taipei city): the more detailed cross-classification 
tables are available, in published form, for the Province alone. But 
it accounts for more than 80 percent of all households, and a larger propor­
tion of total population; and the analysis illustrates certain significant, 
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hitherto untreated, aspects of the size distribution of households in a 
developed and less developed country. 
Table 8 shows the distribution of households of differing size by 
age of head of household, the cross-classifications being compared for 
the United States and Taiwan Province for the same size-classes of house­
holds and identical age-classes of head ranging from below 25 years of age, 
to 55 and over. A number of findings can be suggested, which may not be 
untypical of other comparisons of the size-distribution of households 
between developed and less developed countries. 
First, a dominant proportion of the 1 and 2 person households, 
which loom so large in the United States, is accounted for by households 
at advanced ages of head. Out of the 20.6 percent share of 1 person 
households in all households (line 1), 12.4 percentage points are house­
holds with head aged 55 years or over; of the 30.6 percentage share of 
2 person households, 16.5 percentage points are households with heads 
aged 55 or over (line 2). Yet, while the 1 and 2 person households in 
the United States are dominated by units at advanced age of head, this 
is not true of the larger households, of 3 and over. There is a similar, 
but weaker concentration of the smaller households at the advanced ages 
of head in Taiwan Province, (see lines 9 and 19, columns 1 and 6), but 
it is of little weight because the over-all proportions of 1 and 2 person 
households are so small in that country. 
Second, it follows that in the contribution of 1 and 2 person house­
holds to the smaller average size of households in the United States than 
in Taiwan, the old-age small households play a dominating part. Thus, 
of the total discrepancy in the shares of 1 person households,18.0 percent-
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Table 8 
Distribution of Households by Size and by Age of Head, 
United States, March 1976, and Taiwan Province, end 1975 
Panel A. United States 
Age of Head Classes 
Size of Household All Below 25-34 35-44 45-54 55 & 55-64 65 & 
Classes Households 25 over over 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
% Shares iri Total of All Households 
1. All Households 100.0 8.1 2L4 16.7 17.5 36.3 15.9 20.4 
(72.87 million) 
2. 1 person household 20.6 1.8 2.9 1.4 2.1 12.4 3.5 8.9 
3. 2 person household 30.6 3.5- 4.6 1.8 4.2 16.5- 7.3 9.2 
4. 3 person household 17.2 1.8 4.8 2.5+ 3.9 4.2 2.8 1.4 
5. 4 person household 15.7 5.5- 3.2 1.40.7 4.4 1.9 0.5+ 
6. 5 person household 8.6 0.2 2.3 3.3 2.1 0~7 0.5+ 0.2 
7. 6 person household 4.1 0.1- 0.9 1.7 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 
8. 7 & over 3.2 o+ 0.4 1.6 0•. 9 0.3 0.2 0.1 
9. :eersons per 2.89 2.30 3.15 4.09. 3.43 2.05. 2.41 1.77 
household 
Panel B. Taiwan Province 
Age of Head Classes 
Size of Household All Below 25-34 35-44 45-54 55 & 55-59 60 & 
Classes Households 25 over over 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
% Shares iri All Households 
10. All Households 100.0 3.9 24.1 31.6 28.0 11.8 6.2 5.6 
(2.59 million) 
11. 1 person household 2.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.7 
12. 2 person household 4.8 0.5- 1.2 0.5- 1.1 1.5+ 0.4 1.1 
13. 3 person household 10.2 0.8 3.5 1.4 2.8 1.7 0.8 0.9 
14. 4 person household 16.3 0.8 5.2 3.9 4.7 1.7 1.1 0.6 
15. 5 person household 22.3 0.6 6.2 7.9 6.2 1.4 0.9 0.5+ 
16. 6 person household 19.2 0.5 3.9 7.8 5.8 1.2 0.8 0.4 
17. 7 & over 24.6 0.6 3.9 9.8 7.1 3.2 1.8 1.4 
18. Persons per household 5.37 4.63 4.99 5.85 5.39 5.05- 5.40 4.67 
Taiwan :erovince 





Panel A -- calculated from Table 15, p. 48 of the March 1977 source 
cited in the notes to Panel A of Table 1. 
Panel B, lines 10-18 -- calculated from Department of Budget, Accoun
ting 
and Statistics, Taiwan Provincial Government, Report on the Survey o
f 
Family Income & Expenditure, Taiwan Province, 1975 June 1976, Table 
30, 
Taiwan Province excluaes Taipei city and comprised in 1975pp. 616 ff. 
2.59 million households, out of some 3.01 for Taiwan Area (which inc
ludes 
Taipei City). No comparable detailed data for Taipei city are shown
 in 
the separate report for the latter. 
Panel B, line 19 calculated from Table 12, pp. 148-49 of the sour
ce 
for Taiwan cited for Panel B of Table 1. 
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age points (i.e., 20.6 minus 2.6), the contribution of the old age group 
is 11.3 points, or close to two-thirds; of the total differential in the 
shares of 2 person households, 25.8 percentage points (i.e., 30.6-4.8), 
the contribution of the older age of head group is 15.0 points, or some­
what less than six-tenths. The residual discrepancies stem largely from 
the structure at the younger age-of-head levels, below the age of 35. 
For 1 and 2 person households combined, the shares of these younger groups 
under 35 total 12.8 percentage points for the United States (see lines 
2 and 3, columns 3 and 4), compared with 2.0 percentage points for Taiwan 
Province (see lines 11 and 12, columns 3 and 4). A similar comparison for 
the intermediate age classes, from 35 to 55, yields total 
' 
shares for 
United States of 9.5 percent compared with 2.8 in Taiwan Province. Thus, 
the major source of the higher shares of small households in a developed 
country like the United States is the heavy concentration of these house­
holds at advanced ages of head, presumably after children mature and 
depart; and, secondarily, a greater tendency for apartness at the 
younger levels of age of head. 
Third, the distinctive distribution of small households by age of 
head in the United States, combined with large proportions of these small 
households in the total, produces a structure of households by age~of­
head that is necessarily quite different from that in the Taiwan Province 
(and would differ almost as much from that in the Taiwan Area as a whole). 
Both the shares of the very young households, under 25 years of age of 
head, and particularly of the older households are proportionately 
greater in the United States than in Taiwan Province, the proportions 
being 8 and 4 percent for the younger age-of-head group.(colunm 3, lines 
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1 and 10) and 36 and 12 percent respectively for the old age-of-head 
group of over 55 (column 7, lines 1 and 10). Even more interesting are 
the differences between the two countries in the internal structure by 
size within the extreme age-of-head classes. Thus, in the United States, 
both the under 25 and the 55 and over age classes are dominated by the 1 
and 2 person households; these account for over six tenths of the total 
in the under 25 age class and for almost eight-tenths of the 55 and over 
age class (see lines 2 and 3, compared to line 1, colunm:3 and column 7). 
In Taiwan Province, 1 and 2 person households account for less than a 
fifth of all households at the under 25 age level of head, and for about 
a fifth of the total of household.s with heads aged 55 and over (see lines 
11 and 12, compared with line 10, columns 3.and 7). It is particularly 
striking to find in Taiwan such a large proportion of young heads (under 
25) in households including 5, or 6, or 7 and over members • 
. Fourth, because of these large effects of small households on the 
structure of households at the young, and particularly, at the old ages 
of head in the United States, the movements of the average size of house­
hold through the succession of ages of head, or the life cycle pattern, 
are markedly different from those in a country like Taiwan. With an 
overall average of 2.89 persons, the average number per household in the 
United States rises markedly from 2.3 persons in the under 25 years 
age-of-head group, to a peak of 4.09 in the 35-44 age-of-head class, and 
then drops sharply to 2.05 in the 55 and over class (and even more striking­
ly to 1.77 in the 65 and over class, see line 9). This is a swing to a 
peak al~st double that at the initial and terminal troughs. In Taiwan 
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Province, the range in persons per household through the successive age­
of-head classes (see line 18) is from 4.6 persons in the under 25 years 
of age head class to a peak of 5.9, or only thirty percent higher, and 
then down to 4.7 in the 60 and over age class. The suggested difference 
in the life cycle pattern of a typical household between the two countries 
is obvious. In the United States, that life cycle begins with a substan­
tial period of life in one person household, moves rapidly to family and 
a peak size of over 4 (while the children are still within the family) and 
then enters a prolonged period of a single couple and eventually a single 
person household. Such patterns, while presumably found also in Taiwan, 
are far less common than those in which a household varies much less in 
size over the full span and in which the identity of the head may be shifting 
while that of the membership may be only moderately affected. The impli­
cations of the difference in the amplitude of the swing in size of house­
hold through the successive age-classes of head for the evaluation of distri­
butions of income among households during that life cycle are obviously 
significant. 
The association between size of household and sex of head is illus­
trated in Panel A of Table 9. The proportion of female head households 
in the United States, in early 1976, at 24 percent, was four times as great 
as the proportion in the Taiwan area • .And much of the difference is due 
to the high proportions of female heads among the 1 and 2 person households, 
particularly the former. Thus, of the total disparity in female head 
proportions between the two countries, 18.2 percentage points, 12.6 points 
or about two-thirds, are accounted for by the differing incidence of female 
headship among the 1 person households (i.e., 13.2 minus 0.6, see line 2, 
columns 3 and 6). The female head proportions in the United States exceed 
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Table 9 
Distribution of Households by Size and Sex of Head, and Age and 
Sex of Head, United States, 1976 (or 1970) and Taiwan Area, 1975 
Panel A. By Size of Household and Sex of Head 
Size Classes United States, March 1976 Taiwan Area, end 1975 
of Households All Male Head Female Head All Male Head Female Head 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Entries are% shares in all households 
1. All households 100.0 75.8 24.2 100.0 94.0 6.0 
(72. 87 million) (3. 01 million)
2. 1 person household 20.6 7.4 13.2 3.1 2.5 0.6 
3. 2 person household 30.6 25.5 5.1 5.2 4.3 0.9 
4. 3 person household 17.2 14.3 2.9 10.3 9.4 0.9 
5. 4 person household 15.7 14.1 1. 6 16.9 15.8 
6. 5 person household 8.6 8.0 0.6 22.3 21.1 1.2 
7. 6 person household 4.1 3.7 0.4 18.9 18.3 0.6 
8. 7 & over 3.2 2.8 0.4 23.3 22.6 0.7 
9. Average,persons 2.89 3.18 1.98 5.27 5.35 4.13 
per household 
Panel B. By Age and Sex of Head 
Age of Head United States, March 1970 Taiwan Area,. end 1975 
Classes 
10. All households 100.0 78.9 21.1 100.0 94.0 6.0 
(62.88 million) (3. 01) 
11. Below 25 6.8 5.5+ 1.3 4.0 2.9 1.1 
12. 25-34 18.6 16.5- 2.1 24.6 23.3 1.3 
13. 35-44 18.5 16.3 2.2 30.8 29.1 1. 7 
14. 45-54 19.5 16.4 3.1 28.4 27.2 1.2 
15. 55 & over 34.6 24.2 12.4 12.2 11.5 0.7 





Panel A, columns 1-3 -- calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 104 (Washington, March 
1977), Table 15, p. 48. 
Panel B, columns 1-3 -- calculated from Historical Statistics, vol. 
source cited for Table 7, Series A-323-334, p.42. The averages in 
line 16 are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
Series P-60t no. 72 (Washington, August 1970), Table 5, p. 15. 
Panels A and B, columns 4-6 -- calculated from DGBAS, Report on the, 
Survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan Area, 1975 (Taipei, 
1976). Panel A is from Table 33, pp. 220-221 and Table 14, p. 152 
(the latter for line 9). Panel Bis from Table 32, pp. 218-219. 
I 
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those in the Taiwan Area also for the 2 to 4 person households (compare 
columns 3 and 6, lines 3-5), but it is only for the 1 person households 
that the difference contributes so much to the total disparity in line 1. 
Since we observed in Table 8 that the large proportion of 1 person 
households in the United States was concentrated in the upper age-of-head 
class of 55 and over, and we now find in Panel A of Table 9 that the large 
proportion of 1 person households in the United States is associated with 
a large concentration of female headship, it follows that female head­
ship among 1 person households in the United States should be concentrated 
in the advanced age-of-head class of 55 years of age and over. We can­
not test this inference with the 1976 data for the United States without 
much elaborate estimation. But we can use the data for United States in 
1970 (March), when the over-all proportion of female head households was 
somewhat lower than in 1976 (21 instead of 24 percent)--but still very 
much higher than that for Taiwan Area in 1975 (see Panel B of Table 9, 
line 10, column 3). And the comparison shows a heavy concentration of 
female households in the advanced age-of-head class of 55 and over--
12.4 out of 21.1 percent;,. or about six-tenths (column 3, lines 10 and 15). 
It is the disparity in female headship incidence for this advanced age-of­
head class between United States and Taiwan that contributes 11.7 percent­
age points to a total difference of 15.1 percentage points, or well over 
seven-tenths. 
Thus, our finding in Table 8, concerning concentration of the large 
proportions of 1 and 2 person households in a developed country like the 
United States predominantly at the older age-of-head classes and second-
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arily in the very young age-of-head classes, may now be supplemented by 
the finding that for the 1 person households the large proportions in 
the United States mean concentration on female head households, in the 
advanced age-of-head classes. In other words, a substantial proportion of 
the one-person households in an advanced country like the United States 
are single women in older ages, presumably widows who have survived their 
. husbands. Such a group appears to be quite small in a less developed 
country like Taiwan, small with respect to heading a separate household 
(see column 6 of Panels a and B, which fails to show any clear association 
between female headship and either size of household or age of head). 
V. Concluding Comments 
With some reservations, the statistical evidence on size and size­
structure of households surveyed in this paper, relates to family house­
holds--units from one to several persons, distinguished by joint residence 
and, in case of multiperson units, by ties of blood, marriage, or adoption 
among the members. 
In the comparisons of average size of households in international 
cross-sections of countries at different levels of economic development, 
between rural and urban households within one and the same country, and of 
differences over long spans of time within a developed country, we tried 
to allocate the differences between two sets of factors. One was the differ­
ing number of children under 15 per household, reflecting largely fertility 
and natural increase (NIC factor). The other was the difference in number 
of adults per household, reflecting different propensity of adults to live 
together (or apart 7 the JAA factor). In the various sets of comparisons 
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and findings, we observed wide variations in the relative contribution 
to differences in average size of households of the two factors; with 
both being of substantial magnitude in most comparisons. And the JAA 
factor could be allocated further among the contributions of different 
proportions of 1, 2, and 3-over person households. All of this relates, 
of course, to the well-known substantial differences in average size of 
household: the large size in the less developed countries, with their 
much lower proportions of 1 and 2 person households than in the developed 
countries; similar differences between rural and urban households, 
particularly in already developed countries; and the long-term trends within 
the developed countries towards smaller households, with increasing pro­
portions of 1 and 2 person households in the total. 
When viewed against the larger concept of the family, noted in the 
introduction to this paper, i.e. of a group of persons sufficiently related 
by blood or marriage ties (or adoption) to warrant expectation of joint 
decisions on at least some significant economic matters, size-differ-
ences among households due to greater numbers of children under 15 raise 
no apparent analytical problems. The children, being dependents, are an 
important focus of family decisions, but they cannot be viewed as parti­
cipants in such decisions--as is true potentially of every adult member 
of the wider family group, regardless whether they live together or apart. 
Here the major question is as to the significance of joint residence in 
its meaning in terms of family decisions on economic choices; and the 
question is brought into sharp focus by the finding that in the developed 
countries in recent years over half of all the households were one or 
two person units, heavily dominated by men and women in advanced ages 
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and secondarily among the young--whereas similar proportions among the 
LDCs were well below 10 percent for the two small household groups. 
The question just raised is, to be sure, part of a wider problem 
bearing upon possible clustering of decisions and interest among blood 
or marriage-related but separate family households, regardless of their 
size. If in the course of economic growth the parental pair stays in 
agriculture, -and suffers a decline in relative (if not in absolute) 
income, while its offspring,having migrated to the city, secures in the 
longer run a higher relative economic position, do we view this as emerging 
inequality among households or do we combine the two households in a cluster 
on the ground of sufficient community of economic interest? But the specific 
question raised above is urged upon us by the finding that it was within 
the last few decades that there was a marked morsellization of family house­
holds within the developed countries--in which both the very young, and 
particularly the older members of what were heretofore bigger, several­
generation, family households, separated into apparently independent house­
hold units. 
Three comments can be advanced, which, while obviously not answering 
the question, may at least suggest directions of exploration. The first 
is one already made, and relates to the extent to which separate residence 
means completely separate foci of economic decision that would warrant our 
treating the morsellized distribution of households by size as if they 
represent distinct economic decision units. Offhand, one would argue that 
while separate location must mean separate decisions on everyday alloca­
tion of time of income, this is not true of some of the larger economic 
decisions--larger outlays or decisions with long-term consequences as to 
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location or occupation. And what we need, in this connection, are 
data on the various types of economic decision within the households, 
with particular distinction of those made relatively independently 
and those in which the blood and relation ties among separate family 
households may be telling. 
Second, if we assume that separate location among related family 
household units means, by and large, independent economic decisions 
and that we are warranted in viewing the greatly morsellized households 
in developed countries as truly separate recipient units, one should 
note that such morsellization widens the range of income inequalities 
beyond that afforded within a distribution of households that are rela­
tively larger. All other conditions being equal (including the propor­
tions of dependents, i.e. children below a certain age), a larger number 
of potentially working adults would allow greater scope for the family 
household as an income-equalizing mechanism than would be a size 
sodistribution in which 1 and 2 person family households would be 
relatively numerous. And if there is here this aspect of widening of 
income inequality (certainly on a per household, and possibly on a per 
person basis), to what extent would such widening inequality be a in­
tegral consequence of economic development--in which the reduction in 
the number of children with greater investment in their education and 
rearing, makes the nuclear family an indispensable social institution, 
and forces, as it were, the separation of the very young, and particu­
larly of the older generation, out of what might be called the standard 
family household of the central range with respect to age of head. If 
such an attribution is at all plausible, we have a curious case of 
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secular change in measured income inequality among households 
originating not at the production end, in greater inequality of shares 
flowing from the production system to a standard distribution of 
recipients, but originating at the receiving end, in the way receiv­
ing units organize themselves into households as foci of economic de­
cisions. 
Finally, one may suggest that in the handling of the empirical 
data on household distributions by size and income, the question just 
raised would seem to indicate the value of distinguishing between 
what might be called the marginal units and the standard household 
units--marginal and standard with respect to some model of a prevail­
ing household, in the comparable range, that would mean excluding 
from the standard groups of households those that, with respect to 
their characteristics (such as age of head, and size), represent 
quite a distinct group. This is, in fact, what is already done in 
the statistical data for the United States, with its distinction be­
tween families and unrelated individuals (most of the latter, but not 
all, are identical with single person households); and, in general, it 
is well to go beyond the purely formal aspects of the distribution of 
households, searching for significant groups within them that would 
not be dependent on the statistical expediency of easier identification 
that must be followed in the sample or census surveys. To be sure, 
such attempts may involve some difficult choices as to how far one can 
separate marginal and standard parts of a household distribution, to 
attain greater analytical comparability between,say,developed and less 
developed countries; but such difficulties must be faced in all attempts 
a 
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to convert raw statistical data into quantitative counterparts of 
meaningful economic and social concepts. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1See United Nations, Manual VII. Methods of Projecting Households 
and Families (New York, 1973), p.6. 
2However, households are predominantly family households. Thus for 
the United States in March 1976 (used in Table 1 below), only 2.6 out of 
72.9 million households had members unrelated to the head; so that family 
households comprised 97 percent of the total. (See U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no. 104, (Washington, 
March 1977), Table 3, p. 13). There are no data at hand on this point 
for other countries; but the large preponderance of family among all 
households is generally asserted in the source cited in footnote 1. 
3The earlier paper, "Fertility Differentials Between Less Developed 
and Developed Regions: Components and Implications," Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, vol. 119, no. 5, October 1975, touches 
upon the first point (see Table 10, and discussion, pp.385-88). The 
later paper, "Demographic Aspects of the Size Distribution of Income: 
An Exploratory Essay," Economic Development and Cultural · Change, Vol. 25, 
no. 1, October 1976, explores the second set of findings in Section III, 
Differences in Size of Family or Household, pp. 21-48. 
4see on both points the discussion in the United Nations source cited 
in footnote 1 (Chapter 2, "Evaluation of Data," pp. 12-16). With respect 
to one-person households, the source comments: 
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"Both lodgers and boarders, and even the single persons . 
living separately in apartments, are marginal groups 
whose definitions are generally not clea1,"-cut. The 
distinction between them is sometimes quite arbitrary." 
This c0111ment implies a confusion between loqgers and boarders, who should 
be counted as members of the host household, and individuals living 
separately who should be counted as one-person households. 
5It is in this connection that incomparability in definitions of 
one-person household discussed above in citations from the UN document 
(referred to in footnote 4 above) becomes so relevant. If migrant 
workers in the cities all tend to be classified as constituting one­
person households, the result may be a very high over-all proportion 
of one-person households in countries such as Cameroon (46.0 percent 
in 1957), Sierra Leone (22.7 percent in 1963), Jamaica (19.1 percent 
in 1960)--all of them appreciably higher than many such shares in 
developed countries (see source cited in footnote 1, Table 3, pp. 11-15). 
Whether these be properly defined one-person households or not, their 
significance in terms of the wider concept of the family is problematic-­
a question that, as will be seen below, may be legitimately raised in 
connection with the 1 and even 2 person households in the developed 
countries. 
6The underlying data from UN Demographic Yearbook, 1970, on distri-
bution of rural and urban populations by age and sex, were utilized 
intensively, in an analysis aimed at comparing birth rates and fertility 
between the rural and urban populations, in my earlier paper, "Urban­
Rural Differences in Fertility: An International Comparison," Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 118, no. 1, February 1974, 
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pp. 1-29. The paper contains a discussion of a number of aspects of 
rural-urban differences in proportions of children under 5, and of women 
in childbearing ages (15-49) and of both men and women in working ages 
(15-49). It may be consulted on a number of aspects of rural-urban dif­
ferences relevant to the discussion here. The earlier paper covers a 
larger number of countries, including conununist countries, less developed 
Europe, and temperate Latin America, all of them excluded from Table 6; 
and unlike the procedure in Table 6, derives unweighted averages of 
country proportions £or the relevant DC and LDC totals. But for the 
same coverage, the results in the earlier paper are comparable with those 
in Table 6. 
7Thia ·and later references are to the Historical Statistics volume 
cited in the notes to Table 7. The data on foreign born in 1950 are in 
Series 105-118, p. 14; those on birthrates and children under 5 per 
1,000 white women of childbearing age are in Series B 5-10, p. 49, and 
Series B 67-98, p. 54. 
